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Open access under CC BYThere are different conceptions about how cognitive inhibition is related to creativity. Creativity has
either been associated with effective inhibition, or with disinhibition, or with an adaptive engagement
of inhibition. In this study, we examined the relationship of cognitive inhibition, assessed by means of
the random motor generation task, with different measures of creativity. We also analyzed whether this
relation is mediated by intelligence. We generally found a positive correlation of inhibition and creativity
measures. Moreover, latent variable analyses indicate that inhibition may primarily promote the ﬂuency
of ideas, whereas intelligence speciﬁcally promotes the originality of ideas. These ﬁndings support the
notion that creative thought involves executive processes and may help to better understand the differ-
ential role of inhibition and intelligence in creativity.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
At the heart of every conception of creativity stands the creation
of new ideas. Research, therefore, targets at a better understanding
of the cognitive processes involved in creative ideation. Gilhooly,
Fioratou, Anthony, and Wynn (2007) performed a detailed analysis
of the alternate uses task and found that the ﬂuent production of
new uses was predicted by the ‘‘executively loading task’’ letter
ﬂuency, while the production of familiar uses (i.e., retrieved from
long-term memory rather than created during the task) was not.
They assumed that people with higher executive capacity may ﬁnd
it easier to inhibit dominant responses and switch strategies or cat-
egories. In a similar vein, Nusbaum and Silvia (2011) showed that
ﬂuid intelligence predicts higher switching of categories during an
idea generation task, which corresponds to high divergent thinking
performance. A study by Benedek, Könen, and Neubauer (in press)
showed that creativity is substantially predicted by the abilities of
dissociation and associative combination. This suggests that the
generation of creative ideas requires ﬂuent generation and combi-
nation of mutually remote associative elements (Mednick, 1962).
At this, it was hypothesized that dissociation ability may reﬂect
an indicator of semantic inhibition facilitating the ﬂuent access
to new and remote concepts.
These ﬁndings suggest that creative ability is related to execu-
tive functioning. Some other studies have addressed this issue by
using explicit tests of executive function and speciﬁcally with tests
of cognitive inhibition. Golden (1975) reports that, in a study2b, 8010 Graz, Austria. Tel.:
Benedek).
-NC-ND license.involving high school students, high performance in the color-
word Stroop task (i.e., a classic measure of cognitive inhibition
which requires to name the font color of words which can be
incongruent to the word meaning) was positively related to diver-
gent thinking performance and to teacher ratings of students’ cre-
ativity. Similar evidence was obtained by Groborz and Ne˛cka
(2003), who showed that creativity assessed by divergent ﬁgural
production was related to higher cognitive control as indexed by
the Stroop and the Navon task (i.e., a task which requires to focus
either on local or global features of a stimulus and to inhibit incon-
gruent features).
However, not all studies ﬁnd support for a positive relation of
creativity and cognitive inhibition. Some studies report no correla-
tion of creativity and cognitive inhibition (Burch, Hemsley, Pavelis,
& Corr, 2006; Green & Williams, 1999; Stavridou & Furnham,
1996). And more interestingly, there also exists the opposite view
that ‘‘creative people are characterized by a lack of both cognitive
and behavioral inhibition’’ (Martindale, 1999, p. 143; see also, Ey-
senck, 1995). This notion may stem from the general observation
that creative people are usually characterized by high ideational
ﬂuency, high associative ﬂuency (Benedek et al., in press; Mednick,
Mednick, & Jung, 1964), and are associated with increased impul-
sivity (Burch et al., 2006; Schuldenberg, 2000). Empirical evidence
for this notion comes from a study showing that high creative
achievers were found to show decreased latent inhibition as com-
pared to low creative achievers (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003).
As a third perspective, creativity has been related to differential
or ﬂexible engagement of inhibition. It was shown that creative
people show slower responses in tasks requiring inhibition of
interfering information, but faster responses in tasks without
interference (Dorfman, Martindale, Gassimova, & Vartanian,
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Martindale, & Kwiatkowski, 2007). These ﬁndings have been inter-
preted in terms of a differential focusing of attention; that is, cre-
ative people may be able to focus or defocus attention depending
on task demands. In a similar vein, Zabelina and Robinson (2010)
found that divergent thinking and creative achievement were not
generally related to inhibition as measured by the common Stroop
effect, but rather to a more ﬂexible trial-to-trial modulation of cog-
nitive control.
Hence, although there is increasing evidence that creativity is
related to cognitive inhibition, this evidence appears to be conﬂict-
ing, either associating creativity with high cognitive inhibition,
with cognitive disinhibition, or an adaptive cognitive control. It
should also be noted that most studies on creativity and inhibition
so far have not considered the role of intelligence. Executive func-
tions such as cognitive inhibition are commonly conceived to re-
ﬂect essential cognitive processes underlying general intelligence
(e.g., Arffa, 2007). Moreover, intelligence shows a moderate but
consistent relationship with creativity (e.g., Kim, 2005), and there
is an increasing understanding on how intelligence may facilitate
creative thought (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011; Silvia & Beaty, in press).
Taken together, intelligence may qualify as a mediator of the inhi-
bition-creativity relationship.
The ﬁrst main aim of this study is to examine the correlation of
cognitive inhibition and creativity and see whether it is consistent
for different indicators of creativity. Since inhibition as deﬁned
above is related to cognitive ﬂexibility and non-perseverative
behavior, we hypothesize that there generally should be a positive
correlation. The second main aim of this study is to examine
whether the relation of creativity and inhibition is mediated by
intelligence. Analyses shall be performed at latent level in order
to estimate the correlations devoid of the inﬂuence of measure-
ment error.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
A total of 109 students enrolled in local universities participated
in this study. Five people were excluded because of substantial
missing data, resulting in a ﬁnal sample of 104 (79 women, 25
men; mean age: 23.6 years, SD = 4.0). The sample had a wide range
of majors with the most common being Psychology (53.8%). Partic-
ipants received either a feedback on personality structure or course
credits for participation.2.2. Psychometric tests and questionnaires
2.2.1. Cognitive inhibition
Cognitive inhibition was measured by means of a random mo-
tor generation (RMG) test. We used an adapted computerized ver-
sion of the Mittenecker Pointing Test (Mittenecker, 1958 Schulter,
Mittenecker, & Papousek, 2010), which requires participants to
generate random sequences of key responses at a speciﬁed re-
sponse rate. There is substantial empirical evidence that RMG indi-
cates the efﬁciency of inhibitory processes (cf., Schulter et al.,
2010). Effective generation of random sequences requires the inhi-
bition of the naturally occurring tendency to repeat previously se-
lected sequences. Therefore, task performance is usually lower
when the task is performed at higher pace or with a larger set of
response alternatives (Brugger, 1997). Moreover, low RMG perfor-
mance was consistently related to reduced executive functioning
in neurological disorders such as schizophrenia (e.g., Morrens,
Hulstijn, & Sabbe, 2006) and Parkinsons’ disease (e.g., Stoffers,
Berendse, Deijen, & Wolters, 2001). Finally, latent variable analysesof executive functions revealed that random sequence generation
is solely related to inhibition, but not to shifting or updating
(Miyake et al., 2000).
We realized four task conditions by varying the number of keys
(4 vs. 9) and the response rate (2 Hz vs. 1 Hz). The response rate
was guided by a regular acoustic beat presented via headphones.
The performance in the RMG task was scored for context redun-
dancy of sequence pairs (CR1; for details, see Schulter et al.,
2010). High context redundancy reﬂects dominant use of certain
sequences of keys; low context redundancy reﬂects inhibition of
‘‘prepotent associates’’ and indicates executive inhibition (Miyake
et al., 2000; Towse & Neil, 1998). Since the scale range of CR1 is be-
tween 0 and 1, for further analyses, we reversed the scale by
CR⁄ = 1  CR, so that high scores reﬂect high inhibition. The inhibi-
tion score showed good internal consistency (Cronbach’s a = .80).
2.2.2. Creativity measures
In order to obtain a comprehensive measure of the multi-fac-
eted construct of creativity, a set of different well-established tests
and questionnaires was employed. We used ﬁve tests of divergent
thinking from the Berlin-Intelligence-Structure test (BIS; Jäger,
Süß, & Beauducel, 1997), including three verbal tests AM (‘‘Anwen-
dungs-Möglichkeiten’’; ﬁnd many alternative uses for a cushion),
EF (‘‘Eigenschaften-Fähigkeiten’’; ﬁnd characteristics that a good
salesman should not have), IT (‘‘Insight-Test’’; ﬁnd many explana-
tions why many people think that person X is likeable), and two
ﬁgural tests OJ (‘‘Objekt-Gestaltung’’; compose many objects out
of given ﬁgural elements), ZF (‘‘Zeichen-Fortsetzen’’; draw many
different objects by completing a ﬁgural element). These ﬁve tasks
were selected because for them the test manual provides category
lists allowing for the scoring of ideational ﬂexibility. The working
time per task ranged from 120 to 150 s resulting in a total working
time of about 12 min. After completing all tasks, participants were
instructed to select their three most creative ideas in each task by
marking the responses with corresponding numbers (‘‘1’’, ‘‘2’’, or
‘‘3’’). All tasks were scored for the three most relevant indicators
of divergent thinking ability (Runco, 2010) including ideational ﬂu-
ency (i.e., number of ideas), ideational ﬂexibility (i.e., number of
categorically different ideas), and ideational originality (i.e., origi-
nality and creativity of ideas). For the scoring of ideational original-
ity, the selected three ideas per task were compiled to idea lists,
and then rated for creativity/originality by ﬁve independent raters
(inter-rater reliability ranging from ICC = .47 [AM task] to .84 [ZF
task]). This method allows one to obtain a score of ideational orig-
inality that is not directly dependent on ideational ﬂuency (Silvia
et al., 2008). The originality scores of the ﬁve tasks showed only
moderate internal consistency (Cronbach’s a = .54). We also tried
alternative scorings using the two most creative ideas (cf., Silvia
et al., 2008), or the single most creative idea, which, however, re-
sulted in even lower reliabilities (Cronbach’s a = .47 or .30, respec-
tively). Additionally, a compound score of divergent thinking was
computed as the average of the three z-standardized measures of
divergent thinking (i.e., ideational ﬂuency, ﬂexibility, and
originality).
We measured self-reported ideational behavior by means of a
German version of the Runco Ideational Behavior Scale (RIBS;
Runco, Plucker, & Lim, 2000), and creative personality by means
of a German version of the Creative Personality Scale (CPS; Gough,
1979). We also devised an inventory of creative accomplishments
which lists 48 creative accomplishments (e.g., ‘‘I wrote a poem’’)
from eight different domains (cf., Hocevar, 1979). Participants indi-
cated how often they had done each activity within the last
10 years (never, 1–2 times, 3–5 times, 6–10 times, more than 10
times). We computed domain scores and the scale showed good
internal consistency over domains (Cronbach’s a = .81). Finally,
we administered two items of a dissociation task, which requires
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within 1 min. Dissociative ability was shown to be highly predic-
tive of creativity (Benedek et al., in press).
2.2.3. Intelligence
Psychometric intelligence was assessed by means of the short
form of the test of processing capacity from the Berlin-Intelligence-
Structure test (BIS; Jäger et al., 1997) involving two tasks from the
verbal (WA, TM), ﬁgural (CH, AN), and numerical domain (ZF,
SC). Processing capacity reﬂects the ability of ‘‘formal logical think-
ing and judgement’’ (Carroll, 1993, p. 64) and can be interpreted as
reasoning ability. The working time per task ranged from 60 to
220 s resulting in a total working time of about 14 min. Prelimin-
ary analyses of internal consistency revealed that one subtest
(TM; ‘‘Tatsache-Meinungen’’ [fact-opinion]) shows a low corrected
subtest-total correlation of only .26, which substantially affects
internal consistency of the total score. Therefore, we removed this
subtest, so that the total intelligence score resulted in an accept-
able Cronbach’s a of .70.
2.2.4. Personality
We also assessed personality structure by means of the Big-Five
personality test NEO-FFI (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993). This was
done as part of a standard procedure, and in order to provide feed-
back to the participants; the test, however, was not further ana-
lyzed here.
2.3. Procedure
Participants were tested in groups of 2–5 people in a computer
room at the Department of Psychology. Participants ﬁrst were re-
quested to indicate some relevant socio-demographic variables.
They then worked on the RMG task, followed by the dissociation
task, the divergent thinking tasks, the CPS, the RIBS, the list of cre-
ative accomplishments and some further self-developed questions
related to creative behavior. Finally, the intelligence tests were
administered followed by the NEO-FFI. The total test session took
about 90 min. All participants gave written informed consent prior
to participation. The procedure was approved by the local Ethics
Committee.
3. Results
3.1. Correlation of inhibition, intelligence and creativity
Descriptive statistics, internal consistency and inter-
correlations of all measures are presented in Table 1. InhibitionTable 1
Descriptive statistics, internal consistency, and inter-correlations.
M SD a 2 3 4
1 Inhibition 0.81 0.06 .80 .29** .36** .
2 Intelligence 4.55 1.25 .70 .21* .
3 DT 0.00 0.81 .68 .
4 I-Flu 9.80 2.14 .75
5 I-Flx 6.50 1.26 .70
6 I-Org 2.09 0.21 .55
7 RIBS 64.89 13.85 .90
8 CPS 7.38 3.12 .65
9 CAcc 55.22 25.74 .81
10 Dissoc 12.96 3.53 .79
Note: DT, divergent thinking; I-Flu, ideational ﬂuency; I-Flx, ideational ﬂexibility; I-Org, id
scale; CAcc, creative accomplishments; Dissoc, dissociative ability.
+ p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.shows positive correlations with most indicators of creativity. Cor-
relations are highest with ideational ﬂexibility and ideational ﬂu-
ency but there are also signiﬁcant correlations with self-report
measures of creativity and with dissociative ability by trend. Intel-
ligence is positively related to inhibition, to the compound score of
divergent thinking and to ideational originality. As expected, idea-
tional ﬂuency and ideational ﬂexibility show an extremely high
correlation (r = .86), which is probably due to the scoring methods
which, in both cases, focus on the number of ideas. However, these
two quantitative measures show only a moderate correlation with
ideational originality. Interestingly, the quantitative scores (i.e.,
ideational ﬂuency and ﬂexibility) and the qualitative score (i.e.,
ideational originality) also showed a disjunct correlation pattern
with respect to other creativity measures. While the quantitative
scores are correlated with inhibition, dissociation and the creative
personality scale, originality is correlated with intelligence, self-
reported ideational behavior, and creative accomplishments.3.2. Structural equation models
As inhibition, divergent thinking, and intelligence showed sig-
niﬁcant inter-correlations (see Table 1), in a next step, we tested
whether the signiﬁcant relationship of inhibition and divergent
thinking is actually mediated by intelligence. This mediation
hypothesis was tested by means of latent variable modeling with
Mplus 5.2, using maximum likelihood (ML) estimation.
In this mediation model, divergent thinking was regressed on
inhibition and intelligence, and intelligence was regressed on inhi-
bition (see Fig. 1A). The latent variable inhibition was deﬁned by
four context redundancy scores (reversed scale), the latent variable
intelligence was deﬁned by ﬁve intelligence tests, and the latent
variable divergent thinking was deﬁned by ideational ﬂuency, ﬂex-
ibility and originality. Additionally, an error correlation of two
inhibition scores, representing the shared experimental condition
of four keys, was speciﬁed. However, we did not obtain an accept-
able ﬁt for this model (v2[41] = 131.20, p < .001 [v2/df = 3.20],
CFI = .80, RMSEA = .15 [90% CI = .12–.17], and SRMR = .08). The poor
ﬁt of this model may be due to the heterogeneous deﬁnition of
divergent thinking (i.e., ideational originality showed only moder-
ate correlations with ideational ﬂuency and ﬂexibility).
Therefore, a similar but more differentiated model was esti-
mated in a next step, deﬁning two correlated latent variables of
ideational ﬂuency and originality in place of the compound mea-
sure of divergent thinking (see Fig. 1B). In order to constrain model
complexity, ideational ﬂexibility, which was extremely highly cor-
related with ﬂuency at manifest level, was not included in the
model, but analyzed separately. This model showed an improved5 6 7 8 9 10
38** .40** .11 .20* .24* .00 .18+
05 .15 .31** .10 .08 .04 .07
90** .88** .67** .19+ .25** .14 .43**
.86** .34** .10 .22* .06 .56**
.39** .11 .25** .03 .42**
.25* .15 .25* .08
.42** .41** .04
.24 .14
.07
eational originality; RIBS, Runco ideational behavior scale; CPS, creative personality
Fig. 1. The main latent variable models tested in this study.
Fig. 2. Latent variable model (completely standardized solution) of the direct and indirect effects of inhibition and intelligence on ideational ﬂuency and originality. Note that
the scale of dyadic context redundancy (CR1) scores was reversed so that high scores reﬂect high inhibition.
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.90, RMSEA = .06 [90% CI = .04–.08], and SRMR = .08) with substan-
tial signiﬁcant positive loadings of all regression paths except for
the paths from inhibition to ideational originality and from intelli-
gence to ideational ﬂuency (see Fig. 2). A further model, in which
the non-signiﬁcant paths were removed, showed equal model ﬁt
(v2[147] = 199.20, p < .001 [v2/df = 1.36], CFI = .90, RMSEA = .06 [90%
CI = .04–.08], and SRMR = .08), suggesting that the non-signiﬁcant
regression paths of the previous model are actually dispensable. The
assumption that intelligence mediates the relation of inhibition
and originality was further tested using a bootstrap procedure
(cf., Preacher & Hayes, 2008) with 1000 parametric bootstrap sam-
ples to obtain 95% conﬁdence intervals for the indirect path. This
analysis supported a signiﬁcant mediation effect of intelligence
(estimate = .23 [95% CI = .04–.42]).
Finally, we also estimated the model using the latent variable
ideational ﬂexibility instead of ideational ﬂuency (see Fig. 1C). This
model showed again an acceptable model ﬁt (v2[145] = 188.10,
p < .01 [v2/df = 1.30], CFI = .90, RMSEA = .05 [90% CI = .03–.07],
and SRMR = .08), with only minor changes to the values of the sig-
niﬁcant path coefﬁcients (ideational ﬂexibility on inhibition: .55;ideational originality on intelligence: .51; intelligence on inhibi-
tion: .52; ideational ﬂexibility with originality: .53).
4. Discussion
This study examined the role of cognitive inhibition and intelli-
gence in creativity. It was found that cognitive inhibition, assessed
by means of the random motor generation task, shows a positive
correlation with various measures of creativity including quantita-
tive indicators of divergent thinking (i.e., ideational ﬂuency and
ﬂexibility) and different self-report measures. This provides further
direct evidence that creativity is related to executive functions
(e.g., Gilhooly et al., 2007). Cognitive control in terms of the ability
to inhibit salient but irrelevant responses appears to substantially
facilitate the ﬂuent generation of new ideas. Effective inhibition
may be needed to suppress the increasing proactive interference
of previous responses in order not to get stuck with initial ideas.
It may thus support the active dissociation from prepotent con-
cepts and promote the steady access to unrelated concepts and
ideas, allowing for high ideational ﬂuency (cf., Benedek et al., in
press).
484 M. Benedek et al. / Personality and Individual Differences 53 (2012) 480–485The results, however, appear to conﬂict with the view of crea-
tivity as a ‘‘disinhibition syndrome’’ (Eysenck, 1995; Martindale,
1999). If disinhibition is understood as the ability to ﬂuently gen-
erate many different responses or original ideas, then it has to be
concluded that this functional type of disinhibition is related to
high cognitive inhibition. This may be different from a dysfunc-
tional type of disinhibition, which may rather result in more per-
severative behavior and in the inability to break away from
common or previous ideas (Ridley, 1994).
Intelligence was found to be related to inhibition and divergent
thinking (speciﬁcally to ideational originality), but not to self-
report measures of creativity. A latent variable model was used
to test whether intelligence acts as a mediator in the relationship
of cognitive inhibition and divergent thinking. It revealed that cog-
nitive inhibition speciﬁcally drives the ﬂuency and ﬂexibility of
idea generation (i.e., the quantitative aspect of ideation), while
intelligence has a positive effect on the originality of ideas (i.e.,
the qualitative aspect of ideation). This ﬁts nicely to recent evi-
dence showing that intelligence is particularly relevant to creativ-
ity, when creativity is deﬁned by originality rather than mere
ﬂuency (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011; Silvia, in press). Moreover, the
ﬁndings could be seen in line with the Geneplore model (Finke,
Ward, & Smith, 1992), with inhibition being more related to the
‘‘generation’’ stage and intelligence contributing to the ‘‘explora-
tion’’ stage.
For the scoring of ideational originality we employed a method
that avoids a trivial correlation of ﬂuency and originality (Silvia
et al., 2008). Nevertheless, these two measures still show a sub-
stantial positive correlation at the latent level. Our model here
did not assume a unidirectional relation, as both directions are
generally conceivable and thus might be operant. On the one hand,
a ﬂuent generation of ideas may for simple statistical reasons be
beneﬁcial for coming up with original ideas. Or, as the Nobel laure-
ate Linus Pauling put it, ‘‘The best way to get good ideas, is to get
lots of ideas and throw the bad ones away’’ (as cited in McPherson
Shilling & Fuller, 1997, p. 112). On the other hand, the ability to
generate not only common but also original ideas should result
in higher total number of available ideas. Besides the different con-
tributions of inhibition and intelligence on ﬂuency and originality
of ideas, these divergent thinking measures also showed a discrim-
inable correlation pattern with respect to other measures of crea-
tivity. Ideational ﬂuency was signiﬁcantly related to dissociative
ability and the creative personality scale, whereas ideational orig-
inality was signiﬁcantly related to the self-reported ideational
behavior and to creative accomplishments. Taken together this
suggests that these two divergent thinking measures show dis-
criminant validity, which corroborates the usefulness of obtaining
two non-confounded indicators of quantitative and qualitative as-
pects of ideational ability.
As a limitation of this study, it should be noted that only one spe-
ciﬁc inhibition task (i.e., a random sequence generation task) was
used. This task is valid with respect to other measures of inhibition
(Miyake et al., 2000), but the ﬁndings might not generalize to all
conceptualizations of cognitive inhibition. This may be especially
true, when referring to a wider deﬁnition of cognitive inhibition
which also includes the suppression of interfering stimuli and dis-
tractors (e.g., Friedman &Miyake, 2004). The variety of conceptual-
izations of inhibition may also be one reason for the number of
apparently inconsistent ﬁndings in the literature. Future studies,
therefore, should address the question whether different inhibi-
tion-related functions differentially contribute to creative thought.
As another limitation, the internal consistency of the originality
scoreswas found to be rather low. Employing a scoring of originality
which is not confounded with ﬂuency is useful in order to obtain a
measure with discriminant validity, but it may also result in lower
reliability. As a consequence, it should be noted that manifestﬁrst-order correlations with originality probably are underesti-
mated, and that the estimated latent parameters related to original-
ity have to be interpreted with some caution.
This study adds to the growing evidence on the relation
between inhibition and creativity. It supports the emerging notion
that creativity draws on executive processes, and it provides a
model of how inhibition and intelligence are involved in the crea-
tive idea generation. Inhibition primarily facilitates the ﬂuent gen-
eration of ideation, while intelligence has positive effects on the
quality of ideas.
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